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11.

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a non-final Order entered in a
civil action pursuant to a motion for summary judgment, whereby
the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County,
the Honorable Leonard Russon presiding, dismissed plaintiff's
claim against certain defendants.

Such non-final Order became

final in accordance with Rule 54, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, pursuant to a subsequent Ordpr which resolved all
remaining issues as to all defendants.

This Court has

jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78-2-2 (1987).

ISSUE PRESENTED
Does the correspondence, registration procedures and
course of dealing by and between appellant and respondent
i

satisfy the requirement for a "memoranditim or note" under Utah
Code Annotated §25-5-4(5).

DETERMINATIVE STATUSES
While the issues before the Court are fact intensive,
the statute believed to be determinativ^ of such issue is
set forth in §25-5-4(5) of the Utah Codq Annotated, and
reads, in its entirety, as follows:
25-5-4 CERTAIN AGREEMENTS VOID UNLESS
WRITTEN AND SUBSCRIBED. In tl^e following
cases every agreement shall be void unless
such agreement, or some note oir memorandum
thereof, is in writing subscribed bv the
party to be charged therewith:

(1) Every agreement that by its terms is
notl to be performed within one year from
thq making thereof.
(2) Every promise to answer for the
det|t, default or miscarriage of another.
(3) Every agreement, promise or
tg made upon consideration of
undertaking
mazfriage except mutual promises to marry.
(4) Every special promise made by an
executor or administrator to answer in
damages for the liabilities, or to pay the
debts, or the testator or intestate out of
hi? own estate.
(5) Every agreement authorizing or
employing an agent or broker to purchase or
se1\ real estate for compensation.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.
Nature of the Case
This is an action brought by Machan Hampshire
Properties ( •Machan") to recover a 4 percent real estate
commission f rom Western Real Estate and Development Company, a
Utah corporajtion ("Western Real Estate") ; Western Mortgage and
Loan Corporajtion ("Western Mortgage"), a Utah corporation; and
K-E Enterpri fees, a Utah general partnership ("K-E"), with
respect to the sale of the Iomega Industrial Park ("Iomega
Park") which was owned and sold by Western Mortgage and K-E to
Birtcher Invfestments ("Birtcher"), and to recover damages from
Birtcher and| Capitalcorp Financial, Inc. ("Capitalcorp") for
tortious interference with contract and/or prospective economic
relations.
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After some initial discovery, Machan moved for
summary judgment against Western Mortgage, Western Real Estate,
and K-E on its contract claim for a 4 percent real estate
commission.

In addition to opposing Mabhan's motion, Western

Mortgage, Western Real Estate, and K-E filed a motion for
summary judgment against Machan seeking a dismissal of Machanfs
contract claim.

Several issues were raised, briefed, and

argued in connection with the parties1 Respective motions for
summary judgment.

In its Order dated JUly 22, 1986, the trial

court denied Machan's motion and granted the summary judgment
motion brought by Western Mortgage, Western Real Estate, and
K-E, thereby dismissing Machan's claim for a real estate
commission.

(R. at 453-55; Appendix l.J

The trial court,

however, based its ruling in favor of Western Mortgage, et al.,
solely on the basis that "plaintiff's c^aim is barred by the
Statute of Frauds set forth in Utah Cod^ Ann. §25-5-4(5)
because no writing exists memorializing the claimed agreement
to pay a commissions."

Id.

The Order dated July 22, 1986, did not resolve the
tortious interference claims brought by Machan against Birtcher
and Capitalcorp and, accordingly, was nqt a final Order
pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

After

further discovery, and based upon the trial court's prior
ruling relative to the Statute of Frauds, the parties
stipulated to the entry of a final Order- resolving all claims
as against all parties.

Pursuant to the Stipulation, the trial

court entered its Order dated September 25, 1987, resolving all

-3-

remaining issues with respect to all remaining parties, thereby
constituting the final Order from which Machan brings this
appeal.

(R. at 553-56; Appendix 2.)
Th s Order, and the Stipulation on which it was

based, recognized plaintiff's inability to pursue its tortious
interference of contract claims against Birtcher and
Capitalcorp

n light of the ruling that any such contract was

void due to

he Statute of Frauds.

Accordingly, the parties

preserved Machan 's right to pursue this claim if, on appeal, it
obtains a reversal of the Order dated July 22, 1986.
Based upon the narrow scope of the trial court's
Order dated •jTuly 22, 1986, relative to the application of the
Statute of F auds, Machan hereby sets forth only those facts
relevant to the issue on appeal.

II.
Statement of the Facts
Mabhan is a Utah corporation authorized, among other
things, to a pquire, develop, purchase, and sell real estate,
At all times relevant to this case, Mr. Robert Polcha
("Polcha") was a licensed real estate broker and salesman
affiliated wLth Machan.
Depo. pp. 3 and 4*.)

(Polcha Aff'd., R. at 77; Polcha 1985

Western Mortgage is a Utah corporation

which engages in the business of first mortgage lending.
Western Real Estate is a Utah corporation engaged in the real
estate development business and is a wholly owned subsidiary of
Western Mortgage.

K-E is a Utah general partnership.

-4-

Mr. J.

Kelly Goddard ("Goddard'1), at all times! relevant to this case,
was a vice president of Western Mortgage, the president of
Western Real Estate, and a general partner in K-E.

(Goddard

Aff'd., R. at 208; Goddard Depo. pp. 6-11.)
Prior to January 1986, Western Mortgage and K-E were
the record owners of approximately 16.61 acres of land located
in Roy, Utah, known as the IOmega Industrial Park.

(Goddard

Aff'd., R. at 208.)
In or about January 1985, Polcha had a telephone
conversation with Goddard wherein Polcha inquired about
properties Western Real Estate was marketing.

Goddard

responded by stating that the IOmega Park property was for
sale.

Polcha requested that Goddard forward a package of

information about the IOmega Park for distribution to Polcha's
clients.

Goddard agreed to send such information to Polcha.

(Polcha Aff'd., R. at 77-78; Goddard Aff'd., R. at 210-11;
Goddard Depo. p. 28.)
During the course of this or Some other earlier
conversation, Goddard agreed to allow Pplcha to register his
clients with Goddard and indicated that he would keep a log
entry of the same.

(Goddard Depo. p. 6?; see also, Polcha

Depo. (1986) pp. 18, 19; Polcha Aff'd., |R. at 77-78.)

In this

log, Goddard would record or register tlje name of the broker
together with the clients or investors with whom such broker
was working.

The purpose of the registration system was to

protect the broker's commission, and to avoid the embarrassing
duplication which would occur if two or jmore brokers were

-5-

presenting the same client to the seller.

(Id.)

Polcha

claims that, during this conversation, he inquired about the
commission tcp be paid and Goddard agreed to pay a 4 percent
commission. I(Polcha Aff'd., R. at 78.)

Goddard claims that he

"did not comihit to pay any specific commission amount during
that [February 1985] conversation.11

(Goddard Aff'd., R. at

211.)
By|cover letter dated February 21, 1985, Goddard sent
Polcha information on IOmega Park.
55-56, Exhibits 2 and 7, R. at 262.)

(Goddard Depo. pp. 22-31,
Goddard's letter dated

February 21, 1985, states, in part, as follows:
As I indicated to you on the phone, we
halve accepted another offer, and should you
have success in obtaining a buyer, be sure
thpy understand it would be a back-up
ofper.
Id.

Polcha [supplemented the information he received from

Mr. Goddard and began distributing the same to his clients.
(Polcha Aff'p., R. at 78.)

Thereafter, Polcha requested

additional information on the IOmega Park and Goddard provided
the same.

(Goddard Depo. pp. 59-60, Exhibit 12.)

Polcha forwarded such information to his clients.

In turn,
(See,

Polcha Depo. (1986), Exhibit 13.)
By letter dated February 26, 1985, Polcha reiterated
the agreement he had with Goddard respecting the payment of a
4 percent commission and, in conjunction therewith, registered
with Goddard certain clients.

Mr. Polcha's letter dated

February 26J 1985, reads, in part, as follows:
Machan Hampshire Properties, Inc./Robert F.
Pdlcha represents the following clients in
-6-

connection with the proposed purchase of
the subject properties. The purpose of
this letter is to register th£ clients with
you and to set forth in our understanding
that in the event a transaction is
consummated between yourself £nd these
clients, you agree to pay a cbmmission to
Machan Hampshire Properties, inc./Robert F
Polcha. Said commission shaljL be four
percent (4%) on Iomega Park.
Cal-Fed Syndications
Birtcher American Properties
Equitable Life Real Estate Division.
By letters dated March
April 12, April 30,
'**- -

r

March 12, and March 28,
-••

-

M

r

- -

Park property

,

Polcha continued
.. ,-troduce the Iomega

such letters again reiterated the agreement

that Western Real Estate would pay to Machan a 4% commission in
the event the sale was consummate-' • '/. :"c*.: * (Polcha Depo. (. • 6) and Goddard Depo., Exhibits

" \

". '

16, and 17.)
Sometime in July, August,
te.-..,. •
sale :

.

and

•- September, 198 5, Goddard

indicated

hat

the previous

..- ZOmega Park property had fallen through and that
i

such property was back on the market,

(toddard also requested

Mr. Polcha to contact" hi* clients tic see if;; they In ad any
continuing interest

. .
- :he Iomega Park property,

(Polcha

Aff'd., R. at 80; see also,, Goddard Aff'jd., R, at 2 09,
212.)
. ;ha had not received any
negative response to his registration letters
Depo. pp. 56-59, 62-66,
Polcha at

•-•

-

letter dated August

•

-.
-7

- . -

-*_

Goddard

1985, Mr
vi titled the

m

Estate of James Campbell.

(Goddard Depo., Exhibit 18.)

In the

August 7, 1985 letter, Mr. Polcha indicated that the commission
would be 5% of the gross selling price should the Iomega Park
property be sold to the Estate of James Campbell.

(Id.)

By

letter dated August 9, 1985, Mr. Goddard responded to Mr.
Polchafs August 7 letter.

In his responser Goddard stated as

follows:
InI response to your letter, we have only
agreed to pay 4% commission on the above
p a t k . A l l other terms of your letter are
acceptable.
(Goddard Depo., Exhibit 19; Appendix 3.)

(Emphasis added.)

On September 3, 19859 Birtcher, known as Birtcher
Investments, signed a letter of intent to purchase the Iomega
Park property.

(Goddard Depo., Exhibit 20.)

By letter dated

September 6, 1985, Goddard, acting on instructions from John
Goddard, infprmed Polcha that he had been receiving
Mr. Polcha1s| letters of registratioA of clients, but that he
would not hohor such registration for certain clients.

The

letter further states as follows:
Thpugn most are acceptable, the following
were contacted prior to receipt of your
letters:
1.
2.
3.

DeAuza Corporation.
August Financial.
Birtcher Properties/Cap Corp.

Therefore, we cannot recognize the above.
Should you have any questions, please
contact me.
(Goddard Depp. pp. 78-80; Goddard Depo., Exhibit 21; Appendix
4.)

(Emphasjis added.)
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Shortly after learning JI thej letter of intent
submitted by Birtcher, Goddc • : : ;formed| Mr. Mullins, the
president of Western Mortgage, that Macjian had registered
Birtcher with Western Real Estate.
"what did Mr

In response -

*

question

Mull, ins say tu you in response"1

responded as follows:
My comment was I had received!a
registration from Machan Properties back in
the spring from Birtcher, and that, you
know, there may a situation tljiere that he
might want to look at, and hejsaid, f0h,
absolutely not. How does he possibly feel
he deserves a commission when he1 didn't
bring us the deal, Cap/corp did?
T Qaid I
am just telling you there was a
registration letter back in tfte spring. So
he says something to the effect, 'well,
there is no way he could justify a
commission if he didn't do anything.* So
that about ended it.
(Goddard Depo, p

76.)

After inquiry fifom Polcha respecting

Goddard's September 6 letter, wherein Goddard indicated that
Western Real Estate had prion: contact with Birfchei: Goddard,
In d Jet.ter dated September 12, 1985, claimed that
"Capcorp./Birtcher had presented their coffer r
1985, as you well know "
Exhibit ? ! « i

January 30,

(Goddard Depo. pp

In ij ^ubyequent telephone .conversation wherein

Polcha asserted he was entitled to a coitimission, Goddard
responded as follows:
Bob (polcha) was aware we were working
with Cap/corp., and it was Cap/corp. that
brought us the deal, not Machan
Properties. Had Machan walked in with thi s
deal from Machan Properties, then they
would have received the commis|sion, but
just to arbitrarily mail out a| letter with
no closing date on the contract, anybody
can do that, that's what T told him, 'Had
-9-

you brought us the deal, we would have
honored your commission. You didn't.
Cap/corp. has brought us the deal. We have
been working with Cap/corp. since day one,
ana you're fully aware of it, so whether
thiir investors just happened tof be your
investors is a personal problem.
(Goddard Depd>. pp. 45-46; Appendix 5.)

(Emphasis added.)

An agreement of purchase and sale of real property
was made on <pr about September 27, 1985, naming Birtcher
Investments is the buyer at a price of $7,425,000.00.

(Goddard

Depo. pp. 23+24, Exhibit 1.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Thfe Statute of Frauds is designed to prevent, in
certain cases, honest men from being ensnared, by perjury and
fraud, in alleged contracts that they never made.

In

fulfilling tnis purpose, however, courts have routinely refused
to utilize the Statute of Frauds to defeat contractual
obligations voluntarily assumed.

In order to fulfill the

underlying purpose of the statute, courts require the presence
of some "note or memorandum" that has substantial probative
value in establishing the existence of a contract.

Such "note

or memorandum" need not be set forth in only one document, and
it need not constitute a "formal" written contract.

All that

is necessary] is that such note or memorandum, as explained or
corroborated by parole evidence and/or the surrounding
circumstance|s, remove any serious risk that a fraud is being
perpetrated.
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In the case at bar, Machan and Western Real Estate,
thorlzed agents,|exchanged numerous
letters, all >: which relate directly tp the sale of the Iomega
Park property.

two separate letters^ both signed by

Goddard, Western Rea,l Estate- acknowledged the existeiit e of a
4 percent commission agreement with Machan,
August 9,

In a letter dated

198 5, Goddard stated that "we1only have agreed to pay

a 4% commission on the above park
letter' ai„e acceptable."

All other: terms of your

rhis letter wa^ mailed by Goddard

subsequent to his receipt of numerous registration letters sent
by Machan, all of which recited the existence of a commission
agreement
In tiis letter dated September 6, 1985, Goddard
informed Machan that, with the exceptioii of 3 specific clients,
all prior registration letters reciting the exi stence of a
;ommission agreement were "acceptable."

The basis for

excluding the 3 identified clients was not due to the absence
of a commission agreement, but rather wa[s due to the fact
such clients had aUegedly b^en contacted prior to the receipt
of Machanfs registration letters.

Thereafter, in his

deposition, Goddard confirmed the existence of a commission
agreemer
commission

*--*--*

tJhiat Machan would have? been paid il s
procured the buyer[. While Western Real

Estate may , * i:-. * . defeat Machan1s claim for a commission
based upon non-performance

such *• est imony fnnst Itutes a clear

admission of the existence of an agreement.

-11 •

Accordingly, the trial court erred in dismissing
Machan's cla m for a real estate commission based upon the
application <bf the Statute of Frauds.

ARGUMENT
*HE CORRESPONDENCE BY AND BETWEEN MACHAN
AND WESTERN REAL ESTATE, WHEN VIEWED WITH
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE AND MEASURED
BY THE PURPOSE OF THE STATUTE, CLEARLY
CONSTITUTES A "NOTE OR MEMORANDUM" SUFFICIENT
TO COMPLY WITH THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
A. The Stature;

Purpose and Intent.

The statute of frauds as enacted in Utah, reads, in
relevant part, as follows:
In the following cases, every agreement
shall be void unless such agreement, or
some note or memorandum thereof, is in
writing subscribed by the party to be
charged therewith:
* * *

(5h Every agreement authorizing or
employing an agent or broker to purchase or
sell real estate for compensation.
Utah Code Anh. § 25-5-4(5) (1984).

Utah's statute, like

similar statutes enacted in virtually every jurisdiction, is
grounded in pver 200 years of common law and the thousands of
cases applying the statute have generated, at best, confusing
results.

Sep generally, 2 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts

§275 (1950)
Whlile the case law interpreting the statute may be
confusing, the purpose of the statute can be simply stated:
11

. . . to prevent honest men from being ensnared by perjury

and fraud, i|n alleged contracts that they never made."
-12-

Id.,

§511 at 74 3 , Specifically, with respect to the case at: bar,
the statute

- lesigned "'foi the purposfe of protecting the

owners of land from fraudulent and fictitious claims for a
commisgior

Fowler v. Taylor, 554 P.2d 205, 208 (Utah
- :. id, courts have frequently held that the

1976^

"

statute

frauds may be raised as a shield to fear the

assertion of fictitious claims.
The same courts

however , have also held

illicit t: he

statute may not be utilized as a sword to sever one's
contractual obligations voluntarily assumed.
has been set forth in numerous cases.
2 65 P , Id

i

<1 h \ N . M

Ttiis principle

In Keirseyv. Hirsch,

1 9F> 3) ( fa i" example, the court stated as

follows:
The statute of frauds is intended to
protect against fraud; it is i^ot intended
as an escape route for person$ seeking to
avoid obligations undertaken % or imposed
upon them.
Id. at 3 52,

In Texas Co. v. Sloan, 231 P.2d 2 55 (Kan.

1951), the court stated this principle ks foil ows •
The statute of frauds was enacted to
prevent fraud, not to foster pr encourage
it , , the statute should b4 enforced in
its spirit and not merely as to its
letter. This doctrine has be#n adhered to
down through the years and further citation
of authority is unnecessary. .! . . The
purpose and intent of the statute of frauds
is to prevent fraud, and not ^o aid in its
perpetration, and particularly the courts
of equity, will, so far as possible, refuse
to allow it to be used as a shield to
protect fraud . . . .
Id.

See also, 2 A. Corbin, Corbin on

Contracts §498 at 681 (1950) (it is not to create a loophole

-1.

of escape for dishonest repudiators).

Faced with this

conflicting concern, courts have attempted to satisfy the
spirit and intent of the statute by interpreting the "writing"
to reach the right result, or by applying some
equitable theory, such as estoppel or part performance, to
avoid application of the statute altogether.
B. Note or Memorandum: Elements.
As noted above, there has been a great deal of
diversity in the interpretation of the "writing" requirement.
See generally 2 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts §498
(1950).

To interpret such case law, one must "consider court

opinions crijbically in the light of the purpose for which it
was adopted

..."

Id., §498 at 680.

By its terms, Utah's statute grants a court latitude
in interpreting the "writing" requirement by requiring only the
existence of a written "note or memorandum" rather than the
existence of a written "formal" contract.
299 P.2d lllk (Utah 1956).

Ney v. Harrison,

The formula for a note or

memorandum is difficult to verbalize.
We may well start with this one general
doctrine: There are few, if any, specific
ana uniform requirements. The statute
itself prescribed none; and a study of the
exlisting thousands of cases does not
justify us in asserting their existence.
[Footnote omitted.] Some note or
memorandum having substantial probative
vatLue in establishing the contract must
exast; but its sufficiency in attaining the
purpose of the statute depends in each case
uppn the setting in which it is found. A
memorandum that is sufficient in one case
may well be held insufficient in another.
A complete admission in court by the party
to be charged should dispense with the
-14-

necessity of any writing whatever.
With
ample explanation and corroboration to be
found in undoubted surrounding
circumstances or even in the Accompanying
oral testimony, a writing may! be sufficient
even though it is cryptic, abbreviated, and
incomplete.
2 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, § 4 9 8 at 68 3.
"note or memorandum" need not be set forth in a
single document,

Rather, the requirement may be fulfilled via

a number of letters, telegrams

other writings which,

together dem«
supra. at 2 .
P.2d 369

i -reement.
.'

- Court,

^

Keirsey,

Gregerson v. Jensen, 617

(Utah 1980), has described the utilization of several

writings to- overcome the statute of

frauds as

fullowb:

When more than one writing is used to
satisfy the requirements of tfye statute
frauds, however, some nexus between the
writings must be shown.
This|requirement
may be satisfied either by express
reference in the signed writing to the
unsigned one, or by implied reference
gleaned from the contents of uhe writings
and the circumstances surrounding the
transaction.
In the latter instance,
parole evidence may be used td connect an
unsigned document to one that |has been
signed by the person to be charged.
Id, at*. '

(citations omitted)

(emphasis added) .

The "note or memorandum" is sufficient if it
describes with reasonable certainty:
(2) a genera 1 descri pt :i on

the nroperty;

essential terms and conditions
supra.

See also, Restatement

txj zr

h*

e:;
- .v

^ontrac*

the
N_ey

(Second) of Contracts % ji
* .-*.

(1979); Johnson v. Allen,

*•

i- i *

well established that parole evidence may be used to explain
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otherwise ambiguous writings.

Gregerson v. Jensen, supra;

2 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts §§498, 499, 515, 527, and
528 (1950). |A letter whereby the author repudiates and refuses
to perform due to the breach of the other party may constitute
a "note or memorandum" that evidences the existence of an oral
contract.

2 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts §511 (1950).

Likewise, admissions of the existence of a contract in
pleadings or depositions may also constitute a "note or
memorandum."

Id. at §519.

Once again, the "note or

memorandum" ieed not be the equivalent of a formal contract.
All that is necessary is a showing of the existence of a
contract sufficient enough to remove any significant fear that
a fraud is being perpetrated.
C. Signature).
As|with the "note or memorandum" requirement designed
to validate the existence of the contract, the signature
requirement jLs designed to authenticate the "note or
memorandum.

As noted above, the note or memorandum need not

consist of ohly one document.

So long as the signature appears

on a document which adequately refers to other documents
containing tne essential terms of the agreement, the signature
requirement tLs satisfied.

Id. at §516.

D. Complianck With the Statute in the Case at Bar.
In| the case at bar, the letters transmitted by and
between Machkn and Western Real Estate, the parole evidence
introduced by deposition, and the other circumstances
surrounding phe dispute, sufficiently demonstrate the existence
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of a commission contract such that there is no significant
likelihood that Machan is perpetrating a fraud.
A review of the evidence herein reveals that after a
conversation by and between Polcha and Goddard, wherein such
individuals discussed the availability of Iomega Park for sale
and the registration procedures to be used by Goddard, Goddard
forwarded to Polcha, by letter dated February 21, 1986, certain
information respecting the Iomega Park, together with the
warning that any offer procured by Polcha would have to be in a
back-up position.

Shortly thereafter, Polcha delivered his

letter, dated February 26, 1985, to Goddard wherein Polcha
recited that he would be entitled to a 4 percent commission if
he procured a buyer.

In addition, the letter attempted to

register various clients in accordance with Goddardfs
procedure.

Thereafter, Polcha wrote several letters all of

which recited the 4 percent commission arrangement and
registered additional clients.

In addition, from time to time,

Goddard provided Polcha with additional information respecting
Iomega Park.
At no time prior to August 1, 1985, did Goddard ever
object to the terms of the commission agreement, or to the
registration procedures utilized by Polcha.

By letter dated

August 7, 1985, Polcha submitted his registration for his
client known as the Estate of James Campbell.

In such

registration letter, however, Polcha represented that the
commission to be paid was £5 percent.

In a letter dated

August 9, 1985, signed by Goddard, Goddard responded to
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Polcha's letter dated August 7, 1985, and stated that "we have
only agreed "to pay a 4 percent commission on the above park.
All other terms of your letter are acceptable."
Depo., Exhibit 19; Appendix 3.)

(Goddard

By this letter, Goddard

affirmed the existence of a commission agreement and identified
the rate of commission as 4 percent.
ByI a letter dated September 6, 1985, Goddard
disavowed any commission obligation to Machan with respect to 3
clients previously registered by Polcha.

Goddard disavowed

such obligat:ion not on the basis that there was no commission
agreement by and between Western Real Estate and Machan, but
rather on th k basis that such clients had been contacted with
respect to tne Iomega Park prior to Polcha's registration of
the same.

Moreover, other than those clients allegedly

contacted prior to Polcha's registration, Goddard stated that
all registration letters "are acceptable."
Exhibit 21; jkppendix 4.)

(Goddard Depo.,

When the letters dated August 9 and

September 6, 1985, which are signed by Goddard, are viewed in
the totality! of circumstances, there is little doubt that there
existed an oral commission agreement by and between Machan and
Western Real| Estate.
Tol the extent the foregoing correspondence does not
adequately eliminate the fear of a fraud, one need only review
Mr. Goddard' s deposition transcript.

In response to a question

as to how hel explained his belief that Polcha was not entitled
to a commission, Goddard responded as follows:
Bop was aware we were working with Cap
Co|rp., and it was Cap Corp. that brought us
-18-

the deal, not Machan Properties. Had
Machan walked in with this deal from Machan
Properties, then they would have received
the commission, but just to arbitrarily
mail out a letter with no closing date on
the contract, anybody can do that. That's
what I told him. 'Had you brought us the
deal we would have honored your
commission. You didn't. Cap Corp. has
brought us the deal. We have been working
with Cap Corp. since day one, and you're
fully aware of it, so whether their
investors just happened to be your
investors is a personal problem.•
(Goddard Depo. pp. 45, 46; Appendix 5.)

From the above, it is

clear that had Machan procured the buyer, i.e., performed under
the commission agreement, Western Real Estate would have
honored the commission.

In other words, Western Real Estate

refused to pay because Machan did not perform, not because
there was no agreement.
Later in his deposition, Goddard reiterated a
conversation he had with Mr. Mullins, president of Western
Mortgage.

The subject of the conversation concerned Goddardfs

revelation to Mr. Mullin that Machan previously had registered
Birtcher, the ultimate purchaser on the property, with Western
Real Estate.

In response to the question "and what did Mr.

Mullins say to you in response," Goddard answered as follows:
i

My comment was I had received a
registration from Machan Properties back in
the spring from Birtcher, and that, you
know, there may be a situation there that
he might want to look at, and he said, 'Oh,
absolutely not. How does he possibly feel
he deserves a commission when he didn't
bring us the deal, Cap Corp. did?' I
said, I'm just telling you there was a
registration letter back in the spring, so
he said something to the effect, 'well,
there's no way he could justify a
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conlmission if he didn't do anything. • So
that about ended it.
(Goddard Depo. p. 76.)
Th4 foregoing deposition testimony clearly shows that
Western Real Estate's refusal to pay Machan a 4% commission was
based on the fact that Machan did not procure the ultimate
buyer.

At nd> time during the course of the deposition did

Goddard indicate that he did not agree to pay Machan a 4%
commission ii Machan procured a buyer.

The dispute, therefore,

resolves around whether or not Machan was the procuring cause
of Birtcher's purchase, not whether Western Real Estate agreed
to pay Machan a commission of 4% if Machan was such a procuring
cause.

Under these circumstances, the requirements of the

Statute of Frauds have been met.

CONCLUSION

In service of its purpose and intent, the Statute of
Frauds must be utilized solely as a shield against the
perpetration of fraud, and not as a sword to sever one's
contractual obligations voluntarily assumed.

In the case at

bar, the letters executed by Goddard, when viewed in the
totality of the circumstances, clearly demonstrate the
existence of a 4 percent commission agreement by and between
Machan and Western Real Estate.

Goddard's deposition testimony

further compels the same conclusion.

Accordingly, Machan has

met the requirements of the Statute of Frauds and the trial
court's contrary ruling must be reversed.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2,5th day of February,
1988.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON

MICHAEL N. EMERt
"^
Attorney for Appell^rtC
Machan Hampshire Properties,
Inc.
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing instrument was mailed, first class, postage prepaid
on this 25th day of February, 1988, to the following counsel of
record:

Dan S. Bushnell
David M. Wahlquist
James J. Cassity
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

MACH/AB/MNE
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APPENDIX 1

DAVID M. WAHLQUIST - A3349
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS
330 SOUTH THIRD EAST
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
TELEPHONE (801) 521-3680

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
STATE OF UTAH

MACHAN HAMPSHIRE PROPERTIES,
INC., a Utah corporation.
Plaintiff,

ORDER

vs.
Ciyil No. C85-7387

WESTERN REAL ESTATE & DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a Utah corporation; WESTERN MORTGAGE AND
LOAN CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation; K-E ENTERPRISES,
a Utah general partnership;
BIRTCHER INVESTMENTS, a
California general partnership,
BIRTCHER AMERICAN PROPERTIES,
a California association; and
CAPITALCORP FINANCIAL, INC.,
a California corporation,

Jucfge Leonard Russon

Defendants.

Plaintiff's

Motion

for

Partial

Summary

Judgment

against defendant Western Real Estate & Development Company and
the Motion

of

defendants

Western Real Estate & Development

Company, Western Mortgage Loan Corporation and K-E Enterprises
for

Summary

Judgment

against

plaintiff

came on for hearing

before the above-entitled court on April 28, 1986 at the hour of
2:00

p.m.

Plaintiff

appeared

by

its

counsel

of

record,

Lewis T. Stevens and Craig W. Anderson of Van Wagoner & Stevens.
Defendants appeared by their counsel of record, Dan S. Bushnell
and David M. Wahlquist of Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell.
HaviJng heard argument of counsel and read extensive
memoranda filed by the parties and being otherwise advised in
the premises, THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS:
1.

Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

i

against defendant Western Real Estate & Development Company is
denied; and
2.

Tjhe Motion of defendants Western Real Estate &

Development Company, Western Mortgage Loan Corporation and K-E
Enteprises for Summary Judgment against plaintiff is granted
dismissing plaintiff's action against said defendants because
plaintiff's claim is barred by the Statute of Frauds set forth
in Utah Code Ann. §25-5-4(5) because no writing exists
memorializing thb claimed agreement to pay a commission,
Dated this ry^^?

day of

1986.
BY THE COURT:

^ ^ ^ - v , - / f-lix < wi
JUJJ'GE LEONARD RUSSON

ATTEST
H. DIXON Hli-JDi.E-Y
Clerk

By <& ^9lOT\

dM6**f'
Dcpflty Clerk

APPENDIX 2

Dan S. Bushnell - A522
David M. Wahlquist - A3349
James J. Cassity -A595
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
Attorneys for Defendants
Birtcher Investments, Birtcher
American Properties and
Capitalcorp Financial, Inc.
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2599
Telephone: (801) 521-3680

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MACHAN HAMPSHIRE PROPERTIES,
INC., a Utah corporation,

:

STIPULATION AND ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.

:

WESTERN REAL ESTATE & DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, et al.

:
:
:
:

Defendants.

Civil No. C85-7387

JTudge Leonard Russon

Plaintiff Machan Hampshire Properties, through its counsel
of record, Michael N. Emery, Esq. of Richards, Brandt, Miller and
Nelson, and all named defendants through their counsel of record,
David

M.

Wahlquist,

of

Kirton,

McConkie

&

Bushnell,

hereby

stipulate as follows:
1.

The Motion of defendants Birtcher Investments, Birtcher

American Properties and Capitalcorp Financial, Inc. for summary
judgment dismissing plaintiff's Second Claim for Relief against
them with prejudice may be granted.

The parties agree that under

the current state of the law in the State of Utah, there can be no

tortious interference with a contract which is unenforceable under
U.C.A.

On June 23, 1986, the court entered an order

§25-5-4(5).

dismissing plaintiff's First Claim for Relief because the alleged
contract was (unenforceable under U.C.A.
hereto

underi tand

successful

in

and

obtaining

agree

that

a

reversal

in

§25-5-4(5).
the

of

event

this

The parties
plaintiff

Order,

then

is
the

dismissal of this Second Claim for Relief will also be deemed to
be reversed hfecause it is presently based solely on the Court's
Order, of June | 23, 1986.
2.

Plaintiff's Third Claim for Relief may be dismissed with

prejudice.
3.

Plaintiff's

time for appeal of the June 23, 1986 order

shall begin uo run upon entry of the following Order, all issues
in this mattejr having been reduced to judgment.

DATED t l i t s 7M

day o f t W w t k * ; 1987.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON

B

Y.

Michael N. Emery
Attorney for Plaintiff

KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL

Dan S. Bushnell
David M. Wahlquist
James J. Cassity
Attorneys for defendants:
Birtcher Investments
Birtcher American Properties,
Machan Hampshire Properties,
Inc.
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ORDER
Based

on

the

respective parties

foregoing

Stipulation

and being otherwise

of

counsel

advised

for

the

in the premises,

the Court hereby orders as follows:
1.

The Motion of defendants Birtcher Investments, Birtcher

American

Properties

and Capitalcorp

judgment

dismissing

plaintiff's

Financial,

Second

Claim

Inc. for

summary

for Relief

against

them with prejudice is hereby granted on the basis that:
(a)

Under the current law of the State of Utah, there can be
no

tortious

contract

winth

interference

which

is

unenforceable under U.C.A. §25J-5-4(5) ; and
(b)

The Court has previously ruleq on June 23, 1986 that the
alleged

contract

for a real estate

commission

in this

matter is unenforceable because it does not satisfy the
requirements of U.C.A, §25-5-4(5).
2.
with

Plaintiff's Third Claim for Relief is hereby dismissed

prejudice

based

solely

on

the

foreaoing

consent

and

stipulation of the parties.
3.

Plaintiff's

time for appeal of the June 23, 1986 Order

shall begin to run upon entry of this (l)rder, all other issues in
this matter having been reduced, to judgment.
C'
Jl
day
of
Jj'
' /
DATED this
./ 1987.
BY THE C0URT:
/

rnjki S. Russon, District Judge
Leoiiard
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Approved as

Form:

Emery
Attorney for Plaintiff
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APPENDIX 3

M
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WESTERN

August 9, 1985

Robert F. Polcha
Machan Hampshire Properties
1981 East Murray Holladay Road
Salt Lake City. Utah 84117-5139
Re:

Registration of Client
Iomega Park
James Campbell

Dear Bob:
In response to your letter, we only have agreed to pay a 4%
commission on the above park. All other terms of your letter are
acceptable.
Ver^y ^ruly yours,

Kelly God^krd
President
JKG/lh

> I U R N Rf3A(. * p i A T P A N D PITVCSUQFHvlFMT C O M P A N Y
Box 3 Q B 8 / Ogden. U t a h 8<4<aOS / IB01J B 2 M B 7 3

APPENDIX 4

WESTERN

September 6, 1985

Robert F. Polcha
Machan Hampshire Properties Inc.
1981 E. Murray Holladay Rd.
S.L.C. Utah 84117-5139
Re:

Iomega Park Roy Utah

Dear Bob:
I have been receiving your letters of registration of clients. Though
most are acceptable the following were contacted prior to receipt of
your letters.
1. Deftuza Corporation
2. August Financial
3. Birtcher Properties/Cap Corp
Therefore we can not recognize the above. Should you have any questions
please contact me.
^Jery truly yours,

Kelly Goddard
President
JKG/ns

ESTERN REAL ESTATE A N D D E V E L O P M E N T C O M P A N Y
D. Box 3 0 B B / O g d e n , U t a h 8 4 « a 0 9 / [B01] 6 2 1 - 1 3 7 3

APPENDIX 5

Birtcher and Polcha had not delivered the deal from Birtcher,
I told him I didn't think so.
Q.

You did not think Mr. folcha was entitled to the

commission?

A.

No.

Q.

Am I understanding you correctly?

A.

That's correct, I did uot think he was entitled

Q.

And how did you explain that to Mr. Polcha, as

to it.

well as you can recall?

How did you explain your belief that

you thought he was not entitled to t^e commission?
A.

Well

~

MR. POELMAN:

Are you wbndering what he said to

MR. STEVENS:

Yes.

MR. POELMAN:

Okay.

him?

Bob was aware v;e were wdrking w i t h Cap/Corp. ,

A.

and it was Cap/Corp, that brought us the deal, not Machan
Properties.

Had Machan walked in with this deal from Machan

Properties, then they would have rece ived the commission, but
just to arbitrarily mail out a letter with no closing date on
the contract, anybody can dc that, that's what I told hiir..
"Had you brought us the deal, we would have honored your
a*<~***mmt*0m+mmmm***

commission.
- - V ' ~ *r

L

—

ii ~i-

You d i d n ' t .

Cap/Corp, has b r o u g h t us the d e a l .

wnmmu>~--

We have been working w i t h C a p / C o r p . s i n c e day o n e , and y o u ' r e
DEANNA H. ATKINSON1 ~

CAPITAL REPORTERS

Examination by Mr. Stevens
1

f u l l y aware of i t , so whether t h e i r i n v e s t o r s j u s t happened
kr i n v e s t o r s i s a personal Diubiyill. "•

2
3

Okay.

How did Mr. Polcha respond?

4

He was mad.

5

Q.

Do you recall anything he said?

6

A.

He indicated that it was a large commission, he

7

was not

6

if it ki led the deal, it would kill the deal; and pretty

9

much ended it there.

10
11

oirg to walk away from it.

Q.

He said he'd file suit;

After that conversation, did you have any other

conversations with Mr. Polcha?

12

A.

No.

13

Q.

That was your last telephone call with Mr.

14

Polcha?

15

A.

Telephone conversation.

16

Q.

Have you exchanged correspondence subsequent to

17

that ti me

16

A.

After that?

19

Q.

Yes.

20

A.

No.

21

Q.

Okay.

22
23
24
25

When did you first have a contact with

Birtcher [ you personally?
A.

I had never discussed or talked to Birtcher

prior to the offer.
Q.

That would have been prior to September 27th?

